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Abstract:	Stanford	casts	original	light	on	the	question	of	why	humans	moralize	
some	preferences.	However,	his	account	leaves	some	ambiguity	around	the	
relationship	between	the	evolutionary	function	of	moralization	and	the	dynamics	of	
tribal	formation.	Does	the	model	govern	these	dynamics,	or	only	explain	why	there	
are	moralizing	dispositions	that	more	conventional	modeling	of	the	dynamics	can	
exploit?		
Stanford’s	problem	can	be	succinctly	expressed:	Why	do	humans	moralize	some	
preferences?	This	means:	most	humans	treat	some	of	their	preferences	are	
expressing	objectively	grounded,	universally	binding	norms.	Further	content	
consistent	with	Stanford’s	evidence	and	reflections	can	be	suggested.	A	moralized	
preference	is	one	that	the	moralizer	cannot	propose	to	trade	off	against	other	
preferences	without	expecting	to	experience	shame,	and	without	expecting	others	
to	legitimately	regard	her	as	shamed,	except	in	cases	where	two	or	more	moralized	
preferences	unavoidably	and	clearly	enjoin	opposed	actions.	
Stanford’s	solution	to	the	problem	is	innovative	and	broadly	convincing.	It	allows	
him	to	explain	various	psychological	and	social	features	of	moralization,	and	yields	a	
neat	explanation	of	why	moral	judgments	have	been	so	philosophically	perplexing.	
How	well	supported	by	available	evidence	is	this	solution?	It	depends	on	evidence	
about	moralization	and	on	evidence	about	the	pressures	on	cultural	adaptation	that	
Stanford	invokes	to	explain	moralization.	I	will	focus	on	the	latter.		
The	crucial	driver	of	Stanford’s	model	is	what	he	characterizes	as	humans’	unique	
plasticity.	He	is	not	as	explicit	about	this	as	he	might	be.	Plasticity	typically	refers	
most	directly	to	learning	capacity.	But	what	mainly	does	the	work	in	Stanford’s	
model	is	a	consequence	of	learning	capacity,	namely,	the	observed	fact	that	people	
have	colonized	a	remarkable	range	of	niches.	This	has	in	turn	given	rise	to,	and	
required	cultural	adaptation	to,	a	diversity	of	lifeways.	On	Stanford’s	account,	this	
continuous	dynamism	disrupts	stabilization	of	coordination	and	control	of	free	
riding	by	mere	conventions	entrenched	in	motivational	drives.	Moralization	has	
allowed	people	to	repeatedly	segregate	themselves	into	tribes	which	are,	according	
to	Stanford,	endogenously	equilibrated	but	still	potentially	unstable	because	of	their	
continuing	dispositions	to	construct	or	find	new	niches.	The	potential	instability	
preserves	the	functional	value	of	moralization.	
Stanford	says	little	about	the	dynamics	of	tribal	formation.	One	might	naturally	
think	of	our	ancestors	radiating	from	warm	grasslands	and	scrubland	into	climates	
with	cold	winters	or	dense	forests.	But	human	tribes	manifestly	bifurcate	within	
shared	physical	environments.	On	the	face	of	it	this	seems	to	be	just	what	Stanford’s	
hypothesis	predicts:	a	subset	of	a	founder	population	in	a	niche	moralizes	some	of	
its	new	conventions	in	order	to	achieve	and	maintain	correlated	equilibrium	and	
successfully	exclude	those	most	disposed	to	free	riding.	Then,	presumably	–	
Stanford	is	not	explicit	on	this	point	–	the	excluded	villains	interact	with	one	
another	for	lack	of	an	alternative,	and	form	and	then	moralize	different	conventions.		
Does	the	tribe	of	cast-offs	moralize	for	the	same	reason	as	the	original	moralizers?	If	
so,	they	should	be	expected	to	spin	off	yet	another	tribe,	and	we	predict	a	recursive	
pattern	that	perhaps	terminates	in	the	creation	of	marginal	‘sick	societies’	
(Edgerton	1992),	where	free	riding	is	impossible	because	benefits	from	cooperation	
have	shrunken	to	their	biologically	minimal	core.	One	might	speculatively	imagine	a	
sick	society	that,	forced	into	geographical	isolation,	endures	for	long	enough	that	
natural	section	catches	up	to	cultural	selection	and	we	end	up	with	normative	
psychology	resembling	that	of	chimpanzees.	
An	alternative	account,	also	consistent	with	Stanford’s	dynamics	but	making	it	less	
general	as	a	model,	might	go	as	follows.	We	begin	with	a	first	stage	of	social	
evolution	in	which	the	‘Stanford	process’	gives	rise	to	the	natural	disposition	to	
moralize	suggested	by	the	developmental	evidence	that	Stanford	cites.	Once	this	
biological	adaptation	has	occurred,	we	enter	stage	two,	and	tribal	formation	with	
rival	moral	codes	is	supported	by	more	familiar	strategic	dynamics	of	cultural	group	
selection:	to	compete	successfully,	groups	need	effective	solidarity;	therefore	they	
need	costly	entry	barriers	and	membership	fees	that	reliably	signal	commitment;	
moralization	that	limits	individual	freedom	of	action	serves	this	function,	along	with	
the	function	of	making	members	inadmissible	by	rival	groups	with	different	moral	
codes,	and	aligning	their	self-interest	with	militant	patriotism.	Tribal	formation	
itself	might	then	be	mainly	governed	by	exogenously	varying	resource	constraints	
that	constitute	parameters	on	stable	tribe	sizes,	with	new	tribes	forming	whenever,	
on	the	margin,	some	people	are	better	off	forming	a	new	tribe	than	receiving	a	
diminishing	share	of	the	pie	generated	by	the	existing	tribe.	Generation	of	new	
niches	(i.e.,	‘plasticity’)	on	this	second	interpretation	might	mainly,	in	stage	two,	
help	to	make	new	moral	codes	relatively	economically	adaptive,	thereby	
counterbalancing	the	initial	disadvantages	typical	of	a	smaller	start-up.		
On	the	first	interpretation	above,	Stanford’s	model	governs	the	dynamics	of	tribal	
formation.	On	the	second	interpretation,	it	explains	why	these	dynamics	find	
moralizing	dispositions	to	exploit,	but	the	dynamics	themselves	are	modeled	by	a	
fusion	of	anthropological	group	selection	and	the	economics	of	dynamic	industrial	
organization.	
One	would	be	forced	to	disambiguate	these	interpretations	if	the	model	were	
formalized.	This	leads	to	a	methodological	observation	about	evolutionary	
psychology.	Economists	prefer	formal	models	partly	because	these	generate	
relatively	precise	discriminating	empirical	predictions	that	might	not	be	evident	to	
the	theorist	in	advance	of	the	formal	specification.	Such	predictions	are	important	
not	because	prediction	is	the	primary	goal	of	science	(it	is	not),	but	because	
specification	of	predictions	is	a	crucial	tool	for	identifying	a	model’s	empirical	scope.	
We	see	scope	ambiguity	in	Stanford’s	informal	model	if	we	compare	humans	not	
only	with	chimpanzees,	but	with	more	genetically	distant	animals	that	are	more	
similar	to	humans	along	some	social	dimensions.	Whereas	chimpanzees	form	rival,	
warring	groups	but	not	morally	differentiated	tribes,	orcas	resemble	humans	in	
forming	geographically	overlapping	communities	with	strikingly	different	core	
behaviors,	communication	codes,	and	social	organization.	Individuals	drawn	from	
different	groups	housed	together	in	captivity	don’t	seem	to	get	along	well.	Orcas	
inhabit	all	oceans,	and	we	have	no	independent	metric	for	determining	how	
profoundly	or	shallowly	their	inhabited	functional	niches	vary	with	respect	to	what	
matters	to	them.	Is	Stanford’s	model	intended	to	be	sufficiently	general	to	be	used	in	
deciding	whether	we	should	predict	morality	in	(e.g.)	killer	whales?	Or	is	it	intended	
mainly	to	explain	a	dimension	of	divergence	in	the	ape	/	hominid	evolutionary	line?	
Formalization	of	the	model	might	usefully	force	the	distinction.	
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